Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment by Koudstaal, Martin et al.
TI 2014-136/VII 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship: 
Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment 
 
 
Martin Koudstaal1,2 
Randolph Sloof1,2 
Mirjam van Praag1,3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Tinbergen Institute, the Netherlands; 
2 Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands; 
3 Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. 
 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship:
Evidence From a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
Martin Koudstaal
University of Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute
Randolph Sloof
University of Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute
Mirjam van Praag ⇤
Copenhagen Business School & Tinbergen Institute
October 17, 2014
Abstract
Theory predicts that entrepreneurs have distinct attitudes towards risk and uncertainty,
but empirical evidence is mixed. To better understand the unique behavioral characteristics
of entrepreneurs and the causes of these mixed results, we perform a large ‘lab-in-the-field’ ex-
periment comparing entrepreneurs to managers – a suitable comparison group – and employees
(n = 2288). The results indicate that entrepreneurs perceive themselves as less risk averse than
managers and employees, in line with common wisdom. However, when using experimental
incentivized measures, the diﬀerences are subtler. Entrepreneurs are only found to be unique in
their lower degree of loss aversion, and not in their risk or ambiguity aversion. This combination
of results might be explained by our finding that perceived risk attitude is not only correlated to
risk aversion but also to loss aversion. Overall, we therefore suggest using a broader definition
of risk that captures this unique feature of entrepreneurs; their willingness to risk losses.
Key words: Entrepreneurs, managers, risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, lab-
in-the field experiment
JEL codes: L26, C93, D03.
1. Introduction
One of the most salient dimensions of entrepreneurship is risk and uncertainty. Economic theory
predicts that entrepreneurs, as business owning residual claimants, are less averse towards risk and
⇤Corresponding author. Correspondence: Kilevej 14a; 2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark. Email address:
mvp.ino@cbs.dk. Previous versions of this paper have been presented at seminars and workshops at the Hebrew
University, Copenhagen Business School and SAID Business School of the University of Oxford.
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uncertainty than others (Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Kirzner, 1973 and Kihlstrom and Laﬀont,
1979). Entrepreneurs assume business risks in the most uncertain environments. Their income,
wealth, satisfaction and social status are dependent on the outcomes of their decisions in uncertain
situations.1 On top of that, most of the entrepreneurs’ investment portfolios are totally undiver-
sified (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), also due to capital constraints in the market for
entrepreneurial finance.2 Notwithstanding this theoretical prediction, the body of empirical evi-
dence on risk, uncertainty and entrepreneurship is rather mixed (see Holm et al., 2013, Appendix
Table). To reconcile these earlier findings we conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment among 910
entrepreneurs, 397 managers and 981 employees in the Netherlands.
The recent study by Holm et al. (2013) is most related to ours. They also perform a large-scale
lab-in-the-field experiment with incentives to determine how attitudes towards risk and uncertainty
distinguish entrepreneurs from others. They distinguish between strategic and non-strategic risk.
Strategic risk covers measures of trust and competition. Non-strategic risk is measured in terms
of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. They find that entrepreneurs are more willing to assume
strategic risk but are not more willing to assume risks lacking a strategic, interactive character. Our
study is distinct from theirs in three ways. First, we compare entrepreneurs (in a Western country
as opposed to China) to managers as well as employees and not to the local population at large.
Second we use both a survey-based and an experimental, incentivized measure of risk aversion.
Third, we also measure loss aversion and find that this is the most important diﬀerence between
entrepreneurs and managers in the domain of risk and uncertainty.
More generally, our study can be characterized by the following four distinguishing features.
First, we elicit peoples’ risk attitudes using two diﬀerent measures: one is an ‘objective’ measure
which is incentived and experimental, based on a multiple pricelist (MPL) elicitation method (in
the style of Holt and Laury, 2002). The other is ‘subjective’, i.e., survey-based and self-assessed
(Dohmen et al., 2011). Both are well-established within their categories and have been extensively
validated and used.3 So far, studies testing diﬀerences in risk attitudes between entrepreneurs and
others have either used an incentivized experimental measure in the Holt and Laury style, or a non-
incentivized self-assessed survey-based measure in the spirit of Dohmen et al., 2011). Interestingly,
all studies using experimental measures of risk aversion find no diﬀerences between entrepreneurs
and the control group, whereas most of the other studies do find diﬀerences supporting the common
wisdom that entrepreneurs are less risk averse. By using both measures we can contribute to the
1For further references, see e.g., Cantillon (1755); Say (1803); Knight (1921); Petersen and Rajan (1994); Berger
and Udell (1998); Heaton and Lucas (2000); Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002); Gentry and Hubbard (2004);
Heaton and Lucas (2004) and Parker (2009).
2E.g., Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a,b); Hvide and Møen (2010); Fairlie and Krashinsky
(2012) and Schmalz et al. (2013).
3See Filippin and Crosetto (2014) for a meta-analysis of studies using the Holt and Laury measure to relate risk
to gender. For a validity test of the Dohmen et al. (2011) measure, see Dohmen et al. (2007), Bonin et al. (2007),
Caliendo et al. (2009), Lonnqvist et al. (2011) and Beauchamp et al. (2012). Overall, the Dohmen question scores
highly on re-test reliability within-person and has been shown to be virtually stable over re-test intervals ranging
from three weeks up to almost two years (see Dohmen et al., 2007, and Lonnqvist et al., 2011). However, a recent
study by Brachert and Hyll (2014) shows that occupational choices may aﬀect the Dohmen test outcomes.
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explanation of the mixed findings so far.4
Second, besides comparing entrepreneurs and others with respect to risk, we also try to un-
derstand in what related aspects entrepreneurs and managers are diﬀerent. We consider both loss
aversion, allowing an asymmetric eﬀect of losses and gains on peoples’ utility, and ambiguity aver-
sion, i.e. probabilities are unknown and there is genuine uncertainty in the Knightian sense.5 By
relating the three incentivized experimental measures of uncertainty (risk, loss and ambiguity aver-
sion) to the survey-based self-assessed measure of risk aversion we can extend our understanding
of the relationship between objective and subjective measures of risk. For instance, we find that
subjects’ views of what is risk aversion is in fact a mixture of what economists call risk, loss and
ambiguity aversion.
Third, we use a double control group. Instead of comparing entrepreneurs with the general
population, we use two tightly defined control groups, viz. managers and employees.6 We are espe-
cially interested in the first control group. Behavioral characteristics of managers and entrepreneurs
have been compared in various studies (e.g. Brockhaus, 1980; Schere, 1982; Begley, 1995; Busenitz
and Barney, 1997 and Stewart Jr. et al., 1999), because the two groups are arguably very similar.
Both are responsible for strategic and complex decisions and are managing the employees in their
companies (if any). Therefore they are likely to be similar in terms of many observable aspects,
such as education, age, and labor market participation. We indeed observe that the managers and
entrepreneurs in our sample are very similar, whereas the diﬀerences in background characteris-
tics with employees are sizeable. If these diﬀerences extend to unobserved characteristics, such as
motivation, perseverance or wealth, no fair comparison can be made between entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs. Therefore, employing two relatively similar control groups allows for a cleaner
test of behavorial diﬀerences between entrepreneurs and others. Using the two control groups may
also show to what extent diﬀerences are related to the control group used.7,8
4Examples of studies using Holt and Laury style elicitation of risk attitude are Elston and Harrison, 2006; Macko
and Tyszka, 2009; Sandri et al., 2010; Burmeister-Lamp et al., 2012 and Holm et al. (2013). Examples of studies on
risk and entrepreneurship using non-experimental measures of risk attitude are Hull et al., 1980; Brockhaus, 1980;
Caird, 1991; Begley, 1995; Koh, 1996; Sarasvathy et al., 1998; Stewart Jr. et al., 1999; Van Praag and Cramer, 2001;
Uusitalo, 2001; Cramer et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2006, 2007 and Caliendo et al. (2010).
5Gächter et al. (2010) is the only study we are aware of that also compares the degree of loss aversion across
occupational groups. They find that entrepreneurs are less loss averse on average than others in the risky choice
category. Moreover, managers appear less loss averse than blue-collar workers but not than white-collar workers. The
degree of ambiguity aversion of entrepreneurs has been compared to students and non-entrepreneurs by Koh (1996),
Macko and Tyszka (2009) and Holm et al. (2013) and with managers by Schere (1982). With the exception of Holm
et al. (2013), who do not report a significant diﬀerence, the general finding seems to be that entrepreneurs are better
able to cope with ambiguous situations than both managers and non-entrepreneurs are.
6Many studies have used rather unspecified control groups, such as Van Praag and Cramer (2001); Uusitalo (2001);
Cramer et al. (2002); Elston and Harrison (2006); Djankov et al. (2006, 2007); Macko and Tyszka (2009); Caliendo
et al. (2010); Sandri et al. (2010); Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012) and Holm et al. (2013).
7Many studies that have compared entrepreneurs and managers are relatively old and rely on small samples and
self-assessed measures of risk attitude. The overall findings are mixed, too. Brockhaus (1980) and Busenitz and
Barney (1997) found no diﬀerences between the two groups, whereas both Begley (1995) and Stewart Jr. et al. (1999)
report lower levels of risk aversion among entrepreneurs than managers. Furthermore, a meta-analytical review
by Stewart Jr. and Roth (2001) concludes that managers are more risk averse than entrepreneurs, although this
conclusion is challenged by Miner and Raju (2004) who conclude that the role of risk propensity in entrepreneurship
remains unresolved.
8In a comparison of managers and employees, Graham et al. (2013) show that managers have a lower risk aversion
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Fourth, following the debate in the literature about who can be considered an entrepreneur (see
for instance Parker, 2009; Levine and Rubinstein, 2012 or Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2014), we
verify our main findings by using various alternative definitions of the entrepreneur. In our basic
sample, an ‘entrepreneur’ is someone who founded, inherited or has taken over a company that s/he
is currently (co-)managing and of which s/he has at least 5% of the shares.9 We use alternative
subsamples that are based on ‘stricter’ definitions of entrepreneurship (see Lindquist et al., 2013), i.e.
those that are arguably more successful and thus more similar to the ‘Schumpeterian’ entrepreneur.
Subsamples used incude: (i) incorporated entrepreneurs (Levine and Rubinstein, 2012), making up
almost half of the sample, (ii) entrepreneurs with an above median number of employees and (iii)
entrepreneurs with above average income. In comparable ways, we also use various more selective
definitions of our control groups. Managers in the basic sample are defined as employees in firms
not started up by the respondent, and having at least two direct reports under their responsibility.
The stricter definitions limit the sample to: (i) CEOs (17%), (ii) managers with an above median
number of direct reports and (iii) managers with above median income. Finally, employees are the
people who work in organizations and do not belong to the groups of entrepreneurs and managers
(when using the baseline, i.e., least ‘strict’ definitions for entrepreneurs and managers).
Our findings tell the following story. Entrepreneurs perceive themselves as more risk tolerant
than managers who see themselves, in turn, as being more risk tolerant than employees. This
ranking is consistent with most of the previous studies using subjective measures of risk. However,
based on the objective MPL risk aversion measure, entrepreneurs and managers have similar risk
attitudes, but are both less risk averse than employees. When analyzing the diﬀerences in loss and
ambiguity aversion across the three groups, we show that loss aversion is the missing piece. Whereas
all three groups have similar degrees of ambiguity aversion, entrepreneurs have a significant lower
level of loss aversion than the two other groups. We reconcile these diﬀerent findings by relating
the subjective risk measure to all three experimental measures. All three appear to be strongly
related to what people self-assess to be their risk attitude. Respondents thus have a notion of ‘risk’
that is diﬀerent from economists, and more a mixture of risk and uncertainty. Hence, not only
could a distinct degree of risk aversion of managers and entrepreneurs explain the diﬀerences in
their self-assessed risk attitude, these diﬀerences may also relate to diﬀerences in loss or ambiguity
aversion. All these results are independent of the various definitions we use of entrepreneurs and
managers. In some cases, limiting the sample to more successful entrepreneurs even strengthens the
results.
Our two main conclusions are basically two sides of the same coin. First, entrepreneurs do diﬀer
from managers and employees in their attitude towards risk and uncertainty, but in a rather subtle
way. Second, subjective self-assessed measures of risk attitude measure more than the economists’
strict notion of risk aversion alone. The distinguishing trait of entrepreneurs thus becomes apparent
only after realizing that there is more to risk and uncertainty than risk aversion per se.
than employees.
9Five percent is the cutoﬀ ownership that the tax authority calls ‘a substantial interest’. However, we find that
88% (65%) of the entrepreneurs in our sample holds at least 30% (51%) of the company shares.
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We think it is rather intuitive that entrepreneurs are indeed diﬀerent from managers in the
way they deal with risk and uncertainty and that the diﬀerence is related to how losses ‘loom
larger than corresponding gains’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). The entrepreneur’s position is one in which much more is at stake to be lost than in the
role of a manager. However, our study cannot reveal why entrepreneurs are found to be less
loss averse than managers. Although the general consensus tends to be that preferences in the
domain of risk and uncertainty are stable (see e.g. Borghans et al., 2008, Sahm, 2012, and Fouarge
et al., 2014), a recent study by Brachert and Hyll (2014) cast serious doubt on the stability of
these preferences. Therefore, the descriptive nature of the study prevents us from drawing causal
conclusions. Entrepreneurs might either be less loss averse types or might become less loss averse
when becoming an entrepreneur. In a similar vein, a managerial context might also aﬀect managerial
loss aversion considering the asymmetry in blame and credit within organizations (Swalm, 1966;
Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). We acknowledge that this is a limitation of our study. However,
this limitation notwithstanding, we believe that our study not only contributes to the literature by
further clarifying the unique behavioral features of entrepreneurs in comparison with managers and
employees, but also by oﬀering an explanation for the previous mixed results in this area.
In what follows, Section 2 discusses design and measurement issues. In Section 3 we present the
descriptive statistics of our sample. Section 4 reports the empirical findings. Section 5 provides a
discussion and conclusion.
2. Measurement and sampling
2.1 Measurement of risk, loss and ambiguity aversion
Entrepreneurship is associated with risk bearing, uncertainty, gains and losses. The classic economists
and philosophers who laid the foundation of thinking about entrepreneurship all but Schumpeter
defined the entrepreneur either as a risk bearer (Cantillon, 1755; Say, 1803; Marshall, 1930), an
uncertainty bearer (Knight, 1921), or as agents who are less inclined to avoid losses (Knight, 1921;
Marshall, 1930).10 Intuitively these three diﬀerent concepts can be understood as follows.
Risk aversion is a concept with a very specific meaning in economics. It is the willingness of
people to sacrifice expected payoﬀs to circumvent taking risks. In other words, it measures the
10The earliest philosophic thinker about entrepreneurship Cantillon (1755) defined the entrepreneur as a risk bearer
as a consequence of buying and selling at uncertain prices. Say’s entrepreneur (1803) is a risk bearer because of the risk
of losing capital and reputation due to the likelihood of failure. Hence, Say defines entrepreneurship in terms of the
risk of losses rather than of gains. Marshall’s view on entrepreneurship (1930) is the most common one: entrepreneurs
are responsible for assuming the business risks associated with their enterprise. Marshall also acknowledges that a
few extremely high prices will have a disproportionately great attractive force (Marshall, 1930, p. 554) “because risk
lovers are more attracted by the prospects of a great success than they are deterred by the fear of failure” . Thus,
also Marshall pays particular attention to loss aversion. Knight (1921) was the first to explicitly distinguish between
risk and true uncertainty (ambiguity). He defines the entrepreneur as the particular kind of individual who bears
uncertainty because business decisions practically never concern calculable probabilities (Van Praag, 1999, p. 322).
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extent to which the utility of a guaranteed payoﬀ (for instance 50) is higher than the utility derived
from a proposition with the same expected reward obtained with risk (for instance 100 with 50%
probability and 0 with 50% probability). Risk aversion is involved in decision making situations
where a probability can be assigned to each possible outcome of the situation.
Loss aversion refers to the notion that decision makers prefer to avoid losses over acquiring
gains. Loss aversion was first demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky in their prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984). Loss aversion implies that losing 50 will decrease utility or
satisfaction by more than the increase in utility or satisfaction that is associated with a (windfall)
gain of 50. Loss aversion explains the well-known endowment eﬀect (Kahneman et al., 1990) that
people value the goods and assets they own higher than identical goods and assets they do not own.
Ambiguity aversion is also known as uncertainty aversion and refers to a preference for risks
with known probabilities over and above risks with unknown probabilities (true Knightian uncer-
tainty), e.g., Ellsberg (1961) and Holm et al. (2013). Ambiguous events have a greater degree of
uncertainty than risky events because not only is the outcome uncertain, but also the probability
of the realization of that outcome and, as a consequence, the expected payoﬀ.
Risk aversion
To measure risk aversion empirically, we rely on two measures. The first experimental, choice-based
measure is obtained by using the multiple price list (MPL) format of Dohmen et al. (2010), which
originates from Holt and Laury (2002). Participants are confronted with a list of ten decisions
between two options: a risky one with known probabilities (Option A) and a safe one (Option B).
In each of the ten cases option A corresponds to gaining €300 with a 50% chance or gaining €0
with a 50% chance . The safe option B on the other hand gradually increases from €25 to €250 (see
Figure 1). Instead of asking each participant to reveal their preferences for every decision, we asked
each participant to indicate their switching point.11 For example, a possible answer that could be
selected was “I prefer Option A in decision 1 and Option B in 2-10”. Risk-neutrality is implied in
this setup by a switching point from Option A to Option B at the 6th decision (€150 for sure).
The second, survey-based measure of risk aversion is copied from Dohmen et al. (2011). Par-
ticipants indicate their self-perceived willingness to take risks in general, as well as in the two
sub-domains of career and financial matters. We employed a 0-10 scale, where 0 stood for “Not at
all willing to take risks” and 10 for “Very willing to take risks”.12
< INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE >
11Others have also adapted MPL formats eliciting a switching point from the respondents rather than having them
make separate and similar decisions in a row (see e.g. Dohmen et al., 2011 and Gneezy and Pietrasz, 2014). We opted
for using switching points because the experiment includes multiple MPL formats and we assume that entrepreneurs,
managers and employees are time-constrained (more so than students in a laboratory who have given up the hour of
the experiment anyway).
12In the design of the questionnaire, this question was widely spaced from the incentivized risk measure, which
came first. The question about willingness to take risk in general is of main interest, the ones about career and
financial matters are used for robustness checks.
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Loss aversion
Loss aversion is measured by means of the MPL applied by Fehr and Goette (2007) and Gächter
et al. (2010), which in essence is like the Holt and Laury price list but also includes negative payoﬀs.
In this case, Option A consists of a 50% probability of receiving €6 and a 50% probability of losing
an amount between €1 - €10. When selecting the safe Option B, participants receive €0 (see Figure
2). Again, we are interested in the respondents’ switching points.
Overall, the small stakes in these lotteries ensure that risk aversion cannot convincingly explain
the choice behavior in these decisions, as risk aversion in such small-stake lotteries would imply
extreme degrees of risk aversion in high-stake gambles (e.g. Rabin, 2000; Wakker, 2005; Fehr and
Goette, 2007 and Wakker, 2010). Rabin (2000) therefore argues that under expected utility theory,
people should be risk neutral in such small stakes gambles. We emphasize in our survey that se-
lecting Option A entails a real loss of money.
< INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE >
Ambiguity aversion
Our measure of ambiguity aversion is taken from Fox and Tversky (1995) and Gneezy and Pietrasz
(2014) and uses an MPL structure again. In each of the ten decisions, we present participants with
an Urn A with 50 red balls and 50 black balls, and an Urn B which has an unknown distribution
of red and black balls. The selection of Urn A pays oﬀ €300 if a red ball is drawn and €0 if it is
black. If participants choose to select Urn B, payments vary between €250 and €475 if a red ball
is drawn and is €0 in the case of a black ball, see Figure 3.
< INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE >
2.2 Sampling
According to Holm et al. (2013, p. 1676), obtaining a large-scale experiment involving hundreds of
entrepreneurs and managers “...would be a demanding undertaking anywhere in the world. Owners
and CEOs of established firms are rarely willing to devote their scarce time to time-consuming
academic studies.” They observe that some earlier studies solved this problem by studying the
self-employed, others by using small (convenience) samples, whereas they themselves have gone
to China to perform an incentivized experiment with aﬀordable monetary awards. Their sample
includes 700 private enterprises, excluding start-ups and small-scale household firms, and a random
sample of 200 individuals as control group. They note that their control group is not ideal and that
7
“...the ideal control group would be one that is identical to the entrepreneurs except that they are
not entrepreneurs” (p. 1677).
We took a diﬀerent route to obtain a large-scale sample in a Western country (the Netherlands),
including a control group that is rather similar to the group of entrepreneurs. We decided to bring
the lab to the field and obtain responses from participants online. This practice is not uncommon
when aiming for a substantial response from the field (see e.g., DeMartino and Barbato, 2003; Block
and Koellinger, 2009; Graham et al., 2013). We were able to reach qualifying participants through
our extensive network of the Amsterdam Center for Entrepreneurship (ACE). For entrepreneurs, we
collaborated with “Synpact”, a company that has the digital Rolodex of a random selection of small
and medium sized enterprises, including 15,000 entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. The Rolodex is
supported by frequent contacts through a wide variety of training programs and conferences. The
15,000 entrepreneurs all received an invitation to participate in the online research.13 For managers,
we collaborated with a large and highly reputed training center (“De Baak”), which is part of the
largest and influential employers’ organization (“VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland”) in the Netherlands.
The training center was willing to send our invitation to participate in the research to all managers
they have in file, a total of 5,888. The same invitation was sent to a sample of 7,850 employees, which
were recruited via a Dutch market research agency with access to over 70,000 Dutch employees.
Invitations to participate were sent out to the groups of entrepreneurs and managers on October
1 (Round 1) and to the employees on November 4 (Round 2). All groups had exactly 14 days to
respond and non-respondents at that stage received a reminder after 7 days. Out of all people who
received the mailing, 910 entrepreneurs, 397 managers and 981 employees completed the survey.
Response rates were thus in the range of 6-12%. These are comparable to the European response
rates in e.g. Graham et al. (2013). A comparison of respondents with non-respondents based on the
available observables (age and gender) yields no significant diﬀerences for entrepreneurs and man-
agers. For the responding employees, however, females were slightly oversampled (53% versus 47%).
Incentives
Respondents were requested to first complete two parts of incentivized games and then fill out
the survey, including the subjective measure of risk aversion and several background questions.14
All participants first received instructions about what to expect in general and about the reward
structure. Instructions also included examples to get familiar with the experimental setup. The total
questionnaire took on average 14 minutes, including possible breaks that people took while online.
Except for the general risk question, all decisions in our survey were made incentive compatible
and thus had real financial consequences if one was a selected as prize winner. This was clearly
communicated.
Incentives are such that participants can earn a maximum of €675 (€200 in Part 1 and €475
in Part 2) and a minimum of €90 (€100 in Part 1 and -€10 in Part 2), depending on their choices
13See Appendix A for the translated letter.
14The first part of incentivizes gameswas designed to obtain proxies for overoptimism while the second part aimed
at eliciting preferences such as risk and loss aversion. This paper only reports about the second part.
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and luck. The luck component consist of three elements. First, decisions involve a random draw
whenever a participant selects a risky or ambiguous option. Second, in each of the two parts, only
one decision is randomly selected for payment. Such a procedure is quite common in the literature
(see e.g. Laury, 2006 and Dohmen et al., 2011) and is according to Azrieli et al. (2012) the only
incentive-compatible way to utilize the MPL method. Third, only a random selection of participants
are selected as winners and actually paid out. Given a limited budget and the income levels of the
participants we chose to pay out substantial (instead of very small) amounts to a few (instead of
all) randomly selected participants.15 In round 1 we randomly selected two winners from each day’s
completed participants’ files in the first week and one winner per day in the second week. This
resulted in 21 prize winners in round 1 in total. In the second round, we paid out five participants.
Overall, chances of getting paid out were 1/62 in the first round and 1/196 in the second round.
This was unknown to the participants (and ourselves) beforehand.
Draw and payment schedule
To foster trust, all prize winners as well as all other random draws were performed by a civil-law
notary who also monitored a legitimate course of the payouts. The procedure at the notary was as
follows. Before the start of the experiment, it was agreed that we would pay out the 15th and 30th
participant of each day in the first week and the 15th participant of each day in the second week.
The daily rankings were established based on the registered end time of each survey. Furthermore,
we also determined a payment schedule prior to the experiment which outlined the two winning
choices in Part 1 and Part 2 for each prize winner and whether s/he was lucky when taking the
risky option. The most involved part was to settle the ambiguity in our ambiguity aversion measure.
Here we took two draws from two urns with 101 numbers (0 until 100). The first draw rendered a
benchmark number that corresponded to the percentage of winning (e.g. 88 leads to an 88% chance
of winning). The second draw from the other urn determined if a participant was lucky, which
occurred whenever the second number was lower than or equal to the first number. Overall, these
series of draws yielded a payment schedule that was accustomed to every choice a prize winner could
make. The notary’s oﬃcial statement on the draws (in Dutch) is available upon request.
Default definitions of entrepreneurs, managers and employees
The qualifying characteristics for inclusion in the entrepreneur sample were: all people who have
founded, inherited or taken over a company that they are currently (co-)managing. We also classified
participants as ‘entrepreneurs’ who obtained firm ownership over a company within 5 years after
start-up and who are currently its (co-)manager. Individuals qualify for inclusion in the sample of
‘managers’ if they are employed by an organization that they did not start up themselves and have
at least two subordinates for whom they are directly responsible. We also classify project managers
as ’managers’ in case they have overall responsibility for their projects and at least two direct
reporting lines. People belong to the group of ‘employees’ if they are employed by an organization
15Laury (2006) finds evidence that the two payment procedures lead to similar results.
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and do not belong to the first two groups.16
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Panel A in Table 1 shows the sample descriptive statistics (N = 2288) of the measures of risk,
loss and ambiguity aversion. Panel B reports the correlations between these variables,. For ease
of presentation we have reversely coded the survey measure of risk, such that a higher value now
implies a stronger aversion to risk. Note, however, that the levels of the diﬀerent measures in panel
A are not directly comparable.
Panel B shows that most of the correlations between the measures are rather low. The corre-
lation with the highest absolute value is the one between the two measures of risk attitude. The
survey-based measure of risk attitude is also correlated significantly with both loss and ambiguity
aversion, but to a lower degree. The low correlations between the three experimental measures
support the idea that these measures capture distinct behavorial aspects of risk and uncertainty.
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of some characteristics that are used to define stricter
subsamples of (more successful) entrepreneurs and managers. Panel A shows the income distri-
bution of each of the three samples according to the answer categories used in the questionnaire.
Entrepreneurs are over-represented in both tails of the income distribution relative to managers,
which is a common observation (Hamilton, 2000). We do not observe substantial diﬀerences between
the average level of the entrepreneurial and managerial incomes, though. Both are higher than the
income level of employees. For entrepreneurs and managers, the median income is in the category of
€50,001-€75,000.. For employees the median value falls in a lower category, i.e., €25,001-€50,000,
which is in line with the modal income of €33,500 in the Netherlands in 2013. For all groups we
will analyze subsamples of above median income earners.
Panel B shows that 82% of the entrepreneurs in our sample are the founder of their firms, a
commonly used stricter definition of entrepreneurs. 14% of the firms have been acquired through a
takeover and in 4% of the cases, the entrepreneurs have bought themselves into the business they
currently (co-)manage within five years after its start-up. For managers we are interested in sub-
samples of CEOs (17%) and all managers except those who are responsible for projects rather than
people (82%).
16Participants who are both entrepreneurs and managers or employees, and therefore eligible for multiple subsam-
ples, were instructed to select the one generating most of their income. With the exception of 12 participants, these
instructions were followed up adequately.
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< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE >
Panel C shows that 20% (38%) of the entrepreneurs are currently managing and leading young
firms in their start-up (survival) phase. Some studies define entrepreneurs exclusively as the
owner/managers of start-ups (e.g., Brockhaus, 1980; Busenitz and Barney, 1997), whereas other
studies explicitly take them out (Holm et al., 2013). We shall use the same distinctions to test the
robustness of our results against using various definitions of the entrepreneur. Panel C also shows
that almost half of the entrepreneur sample consists of incorporated business owners. This enables
us to limit the sample of entrepreneurs to incorporated business owners consistent with, for instance,
Levine and Rubinstein (2012). The right handside of Panel C shows the age and size distributions
of the firms that managers and employees work for. As expected these distributions are similar, but
diﬀerent from the ones of entrepreneurial firms. The latter are younger (see panel C) and smaller
(see Panel D). As a robustness check we shall split the sample of managers according to the age and
size distribution of their firms. Managers in smaller and younger, i.e., more entrepreneurial firms,
may be more similar to entrepreneurs.
Panel D of Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of employees supervised by entrepreneurs
and managers. 17% of the entrepreneurs have zero employees and 43% have at most one. We also
consider a stricter definition of entrepreneurship based on the number of employees they employ
(cf. e.g. Tag et al., 2013) and do the same for managers.
Table 3 compares background characteristics of the three subsamples. Entrepreneurs and man-
agers are similar in terms of the most commonly used background characteristics: their age, the
percentage of females as well as their experience and educational background. Employees are dif-
ferent in terms of their background characteristics compared to the other two groups: they are
somewhat younger (mean age is 41), more likely to be female and they have lower educational
degrees on average.
< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE >
3. Results
3.1 Main results
To get a first impression of our main findings, Table 4 and Figure 4 show the means and distributions
of the four measures of risk and uncertainty for each of the three groups of interest.
< INSERT TABLE 4 HERE >
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The first column in Table 4 shows that entrepreneurs subjectively assess themselves as less
risk averse than managers. Managers, in turn, rate themselves as less risk averse than employees,
leading to a significant diﬀerence of the coeﬃcients.17 Two sample t-tests confirm that the diﬀerences
between entrepreneurs and employees, entrepreneurs and managers, and managers and employees
are all highly significant ( p < 0.001 in all cases). Ranksum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests generate
the same results.
The second column shows that the experimental measure of risk aversion is not significantly
lower for entrepreneurs when compared to managers, although both entrepreneurs and managers are
significantly less risk averse than employees.18 The rest of the table reveals that the raw diﬀerences
in terms of loss aversion show a similar pattern: entrepreneurs are least loss averse, followed by
managers and employees. Here the diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and managers is significant at
the 5% level, whereas the diﬀerence between managers and employees is not (p = 0.08).19 The last
column of Table 4 reveals an unexpected pattern: entrepreneurs and managers, who are equally
ambiguity averse, are more ambiguity averse than employees.
The CDF plots in Figure 4 provide further insight into the distributions of each of the measures.
Starting with the subjective risk aversion plot on the top left, one can observe that the peak of
the distribution of entrepreneurs is shifted to the left relative to the one of managers and employ-
ees, thus suggesting that most entrepreneurs have a lower value of risk aversion than managers
and employees. As witnessed in Table 4 as well, a slightly diﬀerent pattern arises in the objective
risk aversion measure (top right), where the distributions of entrepreneurs and managers are more
similar. Turning to loss aversion (bottom left), we find that the distributions appear graphically
more like a mix of the subjective and objective risk aversion measures, with the distributions of
entrepreneurs and managers being more distinct again. Finally, the ambiguity aversion distributions
of all groups (bottom right) are harder to distinguish. Yet the figure confirms that employees appear
slightly less ambiguity averse than the other two groups across the board. Moreover, the graphs also
illustrate that the majority of participants (± 30%) always refrained from the ambiguous option
and rather preferred the risky one.
< INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE >
In Table 5 the output of ordered probit regressions for each of the four behavorial variables is
depicted. Control variables such as age, gender, education, experience and income are included.
17The same results are obtained for the other domains measured, i.e., financial risk and career risk.
18In terms of the certainty equivalences per group; we find that the average CE category is equal to €125 - €150
for entrepreneurs and managers and equal to €100 - €125 for employees. As expected, all average values are below
the expected value of €150. The associated CRRA coeﬃcients (but see Rabin, 2000, for a criticism of this approach)
would be approximately 0 - 0.21 for entrepreneurs and managers and 0.21 - 0.37 for employees, the latter being in
line with the lower bound of the study of Holt and Laury (2002) among students.
19In terms of loss aversion coeﬃcients per group; we find that the average coeﬃcient is equal to 1.11 for en-
trepreneurs, 1.18 for managers and 1.23 for employees. For the sake of comparison, this is in the lower part of the
interquartile range of Gächter et al. (2010).
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Columns ‘a’ show the results excluding some arguably endogenous variables, i.e., education, expe-
rience and income, whereas columns ‘b’ include those as explanatory variables (analogous to e.g.
Dohmen et al., 2010).
< INSERT TABLE 5 HERE >
Table 5 paints a similar picture as Table 4. The first estimation equation shows that en-
trepreneurs view themselves as less risk averse than managers (see the Wald test in the last row of
the table), whereas both entrepreneurs and managers are less risk averse than employees. These
findings are largely consistent with previous studies using survey-based measures of risk aversion.
The second set of estimates supports the view arisen from Table 4 that entrepreneurs are making
similar decisions as managers when taking risky decisions in an experimental and incentived envi-
ronment. Although they perceive themselves as more risk-taking than managers, they are thus not
really. Again we find that both entrepreneurs and managers are less risk averse than employees with
similar background characteristics. The third set of results shows that one behavioral characteristic
is unique for entrepreneurs: a lower level of loss aversion than both managers and employees. The
fourth and final set of results indicate that the diﬀerences between employees on the one hand and
entrepreneurs and managers on the other hand in terms of ambiguity aversion disappear when in-
cluding more controls in the equation. Apparently, entrepreneurs, managers and employees that are
comparable in terms of their age, gender, education, income and experience don’t show diﬀerences
in their attitudes towards ambiguity. This result was also obtained by Holm et al. (2013).
The control variables also have diﬀerent associations with the survey-based measure of risk than
with all three experimental measures. Older people claim to be less willing to take risks in general
(consistent with Dohmen et al. 2011) but none of the three experimental measures is significantly
associated with age. Females are less risk taking according to the survey-based measure (also con-
sistent with Dohmen et al., 2011) but the choice based measures are no diﬀerent for females than for
males. The latter result is largely consistent with the conclusions from a recent meta-analysis about
gender diﬀerences in risk attitudes elicited by this type of games (Filippin and Crosetto, 2014).20
In an eﬀort to reconcile the abovementioned findings, we have also directly compared the sub-
jective and objective measures of risk and ambiguity. Table 6 shows that the subjective assessments
of respondents’ risk attitudes are not only correlated with the experimental risk measure, but also
with loss and ambiguity aversion.21 All three coeﬃcients in the ordered probit regression on risk
20Also for education we find the expected negative eﬀect using the survey-based Dohmen measure of risk appetite,
(cf. Harrison et al., 2007), but no significant eﬀect when using any of the experimental measures. People with higher
incomes view themselves as less risk-averse (by comparison; in Dohmen et al., 2010 the eﬀect of household income is
the same but just insignificant). Interestingly, higher income people are less loss averse according to the experimental
measure but not less risk or ambiguity averse. These results are not included in the table.
21See also Ding et al. (2010) and Willebrands et al. (2012) for other work on subjective vis-à-vis objective risk
measures.
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attitude are highly significant and have the expected positive sign. The measure of risk has the
highest association with the self-assessed risk attitude, but both loss and ambiguity aversion play
a significant part too in the explanation of the self-assessed value. The result is the same both
without (column 1) and with (column 2) controls for entrepreneur and managers. In column 3 all
three coeﬃcients are calculated separately for managers and entrepreneurs by including interactions
with these dummy indicators. The benchmark is the subsample of employees. The associations
between the subjective assessment of risk and the objective measures are similar for managers and
employees; the coeﬃcients of the interacted variables with ‘manager’ all lack statistical significance.
However, for entrepreneurs there are some notable diﬀerences. The association with risk aversion
is lower than for the rest of the sample, although the relationship remains significantly diﬀerent
from zero. The latter does not hold for ambiguity aversion, though; here a similar test shows that
for entrepreneurs we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ambiguity aversion does not impact
willingness to take risks. All in all, the results in column 3 indicate that entrepreneurs base their
self-assessment of risk appetite on their loss aversion, more than on their risk or ambiguity aversion.
For managers and employees this is not the case. A low level of loss aversion is thus a distinguishing
feature of entrepreneurs and they associate this with having a higher risk appetite than others.
< INSERT TABLE 6 HERE >
Overall we draw two conclusions from this analysis: (1) subjective assessments of risk attitude
proxy for more than just risk aversion and (2) there is a greater divergence between subjective assess-
ments of risk attitude and behavioral observations for entrepreneurs than for others. Entrepreneurs
associate loss aversion with risk aversion.
3.2 Robustness Checks
In this section we will first test to what extent the results remain the same when using stricter
definitions of entrepreneurs and managers.22 Table 7 displays the main result of Table 5, using
various alternative definitions. Thus, each coeﬃcient is obtained in a separate regression (see Table
5 for the specifics of these regressions).
< INSERT TABLE 7 HERE >
22Table 2 shows that the samples of entrepreneurs, managers and, to a lesser extent, employees are suitable for the
creation of subsamples based on stricter, alternative, also commonly used defitions of entrepreneurs, managers and
employees.
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For entrepreneurs we use a set of stricter definitions in congruence with the literature mentioned
earlier in Section 3. We use the subsets of: (i) entrepreneurs with an incorporated firm, thereby
mainly excluding the own-account self-employed, (ii) entrepreneurs with an above median number
of fulltime equivalent employees in their company, (iii) entrepreneurs with above median incomes,
(iv) entrepreneurs that have founded their business, instead of obtaining it through takeover or
buy-in, (v) entrepreneurs in the survival phase (firm age  5 years) and (vi) entrepreneurs past
their survival phase (firm age > 5 years).23 Panel A of Table 7 shows the results of confronting the
data with these alternative definitions of the entrepreneur. For managers and employees we employ
the original samples. The last line in Panel A shows the result of Table 5 again.
The panel shows a clear pattern consistent with the findings in Table 5. Whatever definition
of the entrepreneur is used, they assess themselves as more risk taking than both managers and
entrepreneurs. Using objective measures of risk and uncertainty, the data show again that en-
trepreneurs and managers are equally risk averse, but less so than employees. The only notable
and significant diﬀerence with the benchmark appears when limiting the sample to incorporated
entrepreneurs. They are significantly less risk averse than both managers and employees.24 Loss
aversion is the one behavorial feature that distinguishes entrepreneurs from managers. The results in
Table 5 turn out to be robust against using various stricter definitions of (successful) entrepreneur-
ship.
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results when varying the definition of a manager while keeping
the baseline samples of entrepreneurs and employees. Again we find that the main results remain,
irrespective of the definition used. We restrict the sample to: (vii) CEOs or general managers (as
opposed to project managers), (viii) CEOs exclusively, (ix) managers with more than the medium
number of direct reports, (x) managers with bove median managerial income, and (xi) managers in
firms that are older than 15 years. The stricter definitions used do not only restrict the sample to
more successful managers but also, in some cases, to managers that can reasonably be expected to
be more diﬀerent from entrepreneurs than average, such as the ones employed in older firms. Again,
the last line of the panel shows the result for managers copied from Table 5, i.e., the benchmark.
Panel C finally tests some of the alternative definitions against each other. Whether we compare
entrepreneurs of incorporated firms (i) with CEOs (viiii), or whether we compare entrepreneurs (ii)
and managers (ix) with larger spans of control, or higher than median incomes ((iii) versus (x)), the
results remain very similar to the main findings according to the Wald statistics in each of these
cases.25
Another robustness check is based on the idea that many people are belonging to one of the
23We also analyzed subsamples of entrepreneurs based on their share ownership (for instance a minimum of 30%
or 50%), leaving the main result unchanged.
24To support this finding we ran similar regressions using only the sample of entrepreneurs. The regression outputs
confirm that incorporated as well as above median income earning entrepreneurs are significantly less risk averse than
other entrepreneurs at the 10% level.
25We also employed a stricter definition of employees by limiting that subsample to above median income earners
(eﬀectively cutting oﬀ the lowest category of the 26% of wage employees earning incomes lower then 25,000 euro’s,
see Table 2). Again the results were the same.
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groups at the time of measurement, but may have been part of another group in the past. In other
words, the distinction between the three groups in terms of typology is not black-white. Possibly,
the diﬀerences between the ‘pure’ groups are larger when taking into account that some individuals
belong to ‘gray’ areas. Appendix B reports the results from analyses that take this into account.
Appendix Table B1 shows that 71% of the entrepreneurs in the sample have been managers in the
past and 9% is currently wage employee or manager besides being a business owner. Moreover 17
(10)% of the managers (employees) is also an entrepreneur on the side, whereas 12 (9)% of the
managers (employees) have been so in the past. Apparently, people move out of and especially into
entrepreneurship in the course of their professional lives. Appendix Table B2 shows that the eﬀects
found in Table 5 (and 7) do not change when accounting for past and current positions in the other
groups. The coeﬃcients of the controls that distinguish the gray groups from the ‘pure’ groups have
the expected signs (diminishing the main eﬀect), but they are not significant.
4. Conclusion
Common wisdom and economic theory alike portray entrepreneurs as a truly distinct breed. Most
notably, the stereotype is that entrepreneurs, as business owning residual claimants, are more willing
and better able to cope with risk and uncertainty. Existing empirical studies that ask entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs to subjectively self-assess their attitude towards risk and uncertainty, indeed
by and large confirm this conventional wisdom; entrepreneurs take themselves as being more willing
to take risks than non-entrepreneurs are. Other studies that employ incentivized choice-based
measures of risk aversion, however, find little diﬀerences between entrepreneurs and the comparison
group employed. These opposing findings immediately raise the question of whether entrepreneurs’
more positive attitude towards risk is merely a common (mis)perception, or whether they have truly
distinct preferences.
In this paper we report the results from a lab-in-the-field experiment that sheds light on this
matter. Our experiment has a number of distinguishing features. First of all, it is relatively large in
size with 2288 respondents overall, including 910 entrepreneurs. Second, we compare entrepreneurs
with two well-defined control groups, viz. managers and employees. Entrepreneurs and managers are
very similar in terms of background characteristics and arguably also in terms of the professional de-
cisions and tasks they face, including managing the employees they direct. Yet as residual claimants
only entrepreneurs directly feel the financial consequences of the decisions they take. Especially this
diﬀerence is thought to draw people with distinct risk preferences into entrepreneurship. Diﬀerences
between entrepreneurs and employees (both in terms of background characteristics and professional
activities) are more pronounced. Third, we collect a large variety of background characteristics
and measures of individual ‘success’. This allows us to zoom in on particular subsamples, using
more stringent definitions of both entrepreneurs and managers based on being ‘more succussful’.
Last, we include both a subjective, survey-based measure of risk attitude, as well as incentivized,
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choice-based measures of risk related preferences. This allows us to compare subjective perceptions
of risk attitude with objectives measures based on actual choices with true financial consequences.
Besides a standard measure of risk aversion, we also include measures of loss aversion and ambiguity
aversion.
In line with previous studies and conventional wisdom, the entrepreneurs in our sample on av-
erage perceive themselves as being more risk tolerant than the other respondents. This not only
holds with respect to the employees in our sample, but also in regard to the more comparable
control group of managers. Based on the incentived choice-based measure of risk aversion, how-
ever, entrepreneurs are equally risk averse as managers (with employees being significantly more
risk averse). The diﬀerent perceptions of entrepreneurs and managers thus cannot be explained by
diﬀerences in risk aversion as narrowly defined by economists. Rather, our results show that these
diﬀerent perceptions mainly result from significant diﬀerences in attitudes towards losses; managers
are significantly more loss averse than entrepreneurs are (with employees in turn being more loss
averse than managers, although not significantly). The three groups do not diﬀer in terms of am-
biguity aversion. These findings are largely independent of the definition of who is an entrepreneur
and who is a manager. If anything, limiting the sample to more successful entrepreneurs somewhat
strengthens our results.
When self-assessing their ‘willingness to take risks in general’ on a 0 to 10 scale, respondents ap-
pear to have a broader notion of ‘risk’ in mind than the narrow risk aversion measure of economists.
Besides risk aversion, also ambiguity and loss aversion play an important role in shaping individual
perceptions. For the perceived diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and managers, loss aversion turns
out to be key. Managers are on average more inclined to avoid losses than entrepreneurs are, leading
to a lower self-assessed willingness to take risks.
Overall we conclude that, when it comes to attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, entrepreneurs
are diﬀerent but in a rather subtle way. The Merriam-Webster dictionary website defines an en-
trepreneur as "...a person who starts a business and is willing to risk loss in order to make money".
In terms of their willingness to risk losses, entrepreneurs indeed appear to be distinct.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Measures of Risk, Loss, and Ambiguity Aversion
Panel A: Means Observations Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum
Risk Aversion
- Survey measure1 2288 3.67 1.79 0 10
- Experimental measure 2288 5.38 2.76 0 10
Loss Aversion 2288 5.05 2.65 0 10
Ambiguity Aversion 2288 5.74 3.64 0 10
Panel B: Correlations Risk Aversion Risk Aversion Loss Aversion Ambiguity Aversion
Survey (S) or
Experimental (E) (S) (E) (E) (E)
Risk Aversion
- Survey measure1 -
- Experimental measure 0.17 -
Loss Aversion 0.12 0.05 -
Ambiguity Aversion 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -
1 Reverse coded measure of “Willingness to take risks”
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the two measures of risk aversion, loss aversion and ambiguity aversion.
The survey measure of risk aversion is a reverse coded measure of the original self-reported willingness to take risks.
In the reverse coded survey measure, 0 corresponds to the highest level of wilingness to take risks and 10 the lowest.
The experimental measure of risk aversion is equal to the number of safe decisions made in the 10 decisions, and
ranges from 0 to 10. Hence, more risk averse participants have a higher score. Similarly, loss aversion measures the
number of safe decisions made in the loss aversion multiple price list (range: 0-10). Ambiguity aversion (range:
0-10) is equal to a participant’s number of non-ambiguous decisions in the multiple price list for ambiguity. The
higher the value, the more ambiguity averse is the person.
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Table 2: Descriptives of Variables to Define Sample Splits within Entrepreneurs, Managers, and Employees
Entrepreneurs Managers Employees
(N = 910) (N = 397) (N = 981)
Panel A: Income
< €25,000 23% < €25,000 2% 26%
€25,001 - €50,000 20% €25,001 - €50,000 17% 58%
€50,001 - €75,000 19% €50,001 - €75,000 34% 12%
€75,001 - €125,000 20% €75,001 - €125,000 36% 3%
€125,001 - €200,000 11% €125,001 - €200,000 8% 1%
€200,001 - €300,000 4% €200,001 - €300,000 2% 0%
€300,001 - €400,000 1% €300,001 - €400,000 0% 0%
> €400,000 2% > €400,000 1% 0%
Panel B: Entrepreneur/Manager characteristics
Founder 82% CEO 17% -
Business taken over 14% General Manager 65% -
Joined the firm within 5 yrs 4% Project Manager 18% -
Panel C: Firm characteristics
Start-up phase (0 - 3 yrs) 20% Firm age  5 yrs 5% 6%
Survival phase (0 - 5 yrs) 38% Firm age 6 - 50 yrs 50% 55%
Firm age > 50 yrs 45% 39%
Incorporated 49% Firm size  25 FTE 13% 19%
Sole propriotership 38% Firm size 26 - 1000 FTE 53% 50%
Other 13% Firm size > 1000 FTE 34% 31%
Panel D: Management level
No. of FTE in own firm: Direct reports:
0 17% 2 - 5 45% -
1 26% 6 - 10 30% -
2 - 5 25% 11 - 25 19% -
6 - 10 10% 26 - 50 4% -
11 - 25 11% More than 50 2% -
26 - 50 5%
51 - 100 4%
101 - 500 1%
More than 500 1%
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Table 3: Background Characteristics of Entrepreneurs, Managers, and Employees
Entrepreneurs Managers Employees
Age 47.36 a 46.45 c 41.24 a,c
Female (dummy) 0.25 a 0.28 c 0.53 a,c
Education (highest degree): d f d,f
- High School 4% 2% 3%
- Lower intermediate vocational degree 12% 11% 34%
- College education 46% 42% 42%
- University education 38% 45% 21%
Number of observations 910 397 981
a) Significant diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and employees at the 5% level (two-sample t-test)
b) Significant diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and managers at the 5% level (two-sample t-test)
c) Significant diﬀerence between managers and employees at the 5% level (two-sample t-test)
d) Significant diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and employees at the 5% level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test)
e) Significant diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and managers at the 5% level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test)
f) Significant diﬀerence between managers and employees at the 5% level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test)
24
Table 4: Raw Diﬀerences in Risk, Loss, and Ambiguity Aversion of Entrepreneurs, Managers and
Employees
Risk Risk Loss Ambiguity
Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion
Survey (S) or
Experimental (E) (S) (E) (E) (E)
Entrepreneurs 3.10 a,b 5.03 a 4.77 a,b 5.88 a
Managers 3.69 b,c 5.17 c 5.08 b 5.90 c
Employees 4.20 a,c 5.78 a,c 5.29 a 5.54 a,c
a) Significant diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and employees at the 5% level (two-sample t-test)
b) Significant diﬀerence between entrepreneurs and managers at the 5% level (two-sample t-test)
c) Significant diﬀerence between managers and employees at the 5% level (two-sample t-test)
See the note below Table 1 for the definitions of the variables.
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Table 5: Risk -, Loss - , and Ambiguity Aversion of Entrepreneurs, Managers and Employees
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Dep. variable: Risk Risk Risk Risk Loss Loss Ambiguity Ambiguity
Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion
Survey (S) or
Experimental (E) (S) (S) (E) (E) (E) (E) (E) (E)
Entrepreneur -0.655⇤⇤⇤ -0.650⇤⇤⇤ -0.261⇤⇤⇤ -0.282⇤⇤⇤ -0.200⇤⇤⇤ -0.207⇤⇤⇤ 0.104⇤⇤ 0.0198
[-12.43] [-9.23] [-5.05] [-4.03] [-3.89] [-3.06] [1.99] [0.29]
Manager -0.256⇤⇤⇤ -0.203⇤⇤⇤ -0.203⇤⇤⇤ -0.254⇤⇤⇤ -0.0929 -0.0176 0.120⇤ 0.0484
[4.23] [-2.63] [-3.32] [-3.29] [-1.52] [-0.23] [1.88] [0.59]
Age 0.0299⇤⇤ 0.0368⇤⇤ -0.0206 -0.0269⇤ -0.0128 -0.00815 0.00616 0.0102
[2.20] [2.28] [-1.51] [-1.68] [-0.98] [-0.54] [0.47] [0.69]
Age squared -0.000237 0.000275 0.000246 0.000320⇤ 0.000154 0.000117 -0.000112 -0.000153
[-1.57] [1.59] [1.60] [1.81] [1.03] [0.69] [-0.76] [-0.95]
Female 0.234⇤⇤⇤ 0.134⇤⇤ 0.0311 -0.00121 0.0612 0.0365 -0.00155 -0.0113
[4.98] [2.49] [0.66] [-0.02] [1.31] [0.66] [-0.03] [-0.21]
Controls for NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
education,
experience,
and income
N 2288 1805 2288 1805 2288 1805 2288 1805
Log lik. -4235.2 -3307.9 -5055.4 -3956.6 -4920.8 -3848.6 -4919.7 -3826.6
ENT=MAN1 < 0.001*** < 0.001*** 0.31 0.60 0.06* < 0.01*** 0.80 0.36
1) This row reports the p-values of Wald tests on  (ENTREPRENEUR) =  (MANAGER).
Most variables have been defined earlier. The categorical variables ‘education’ and ‘income’ have been summarized
into one variable instead of using a set of dummies. the education variable takes on the value 0 if the highest
attained level is high school or lower, 1 if secondary education is obtained at a higher level, 2 if a participant has
college education and 3 if the participant has a university degree. Income has been collapsed into one continuous
variable of which the natural log has been taken, using the midpoints of the categories (and 1 million euro for the
upper category). Experience measures the years of experience as entrepreneur, manager, and employee, respectively.
Significance at the 10% level is denoted by *, 5% by **, and 1% by ***, with t-statistics reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust.
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Table 6: Relationship between Risk -, Loss -, and Ambiguity Aversion and Willingness to Take Risks
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Risk Risk Risk
Aversion Aversion Aversion
Survey (S) or (S) (S) (S)
Experimental (E)
Risk Aversion (E) 0.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.0880⇤⇤⇤ 0.118⇤⇤⇤
[7.36] [6.20] [5.44]
Loss Aversion (E) 0.0724⇤⇤⇤ 0.0579⇤⇤ 0.0601⇤⇤
[4.71] [3.90] [2.42]
Ambiguity Aversion (E) 0.0318⇤⇤⇤ 0.0363⇤⇤⇤ 0.0503⇤⇤⇤
[3.03] [3.56] [2.97]
Entrepreneur -1.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.363
[-12.64] [-1.39]
Entrepreneur x Risk Aversion (E) -0.0729⇤⇤
[-2.40]
Entrepreneur x Loss Aversion (E) -0.00330
[-0.10]
Entrepreneur x Ambiguity Aversion (E) -0.0409⇤
[-1.83]
Manager -0.448⇤⇤⇤ -0.386
[-4.51] [-1.03]
Manager x Risk Aversion (E) -0.0322
[-0.78]
Manager x Loss Aversion (E) 0.0119
[0.29]
Manager x Ambiguity Aversion (E) 0.00983
[0.34]
Constant 2.547⇤⇤⇤ 3.175⇤⇤⇤ 2.901⇤⇤⇤
[20.62] [23.76] [14.13]
N 2288 2288 2288
Log lik. -4522.4 -4443.2 -4437.6
All variables have been defined earlier. Significance at the 10% level is denoted by *, 5% by **, and 1% by ***.
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Table 7: Diﬀerences in Risk Attitude using Stricter Definitions of Entrepreneurs and Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Risk Risk Loss Ambiguity
Aversion Aversion Aversion Aversion
Survey (S) or (S) (E) (E) (E)
Experimental (E)
Panel A: Subsets of Entrepreneurs,
all Managers & Employees
i) Incorporated (N = 446) -0.702 a,b -0.442 a,b -0.400 a,b 0.0772
[-7.84] [-3.78] [-3.43] [0.65]
ii) Above median no. of employees (N = 401) -0.730 a,b -0.282 a -0.270 a,b 0.0831
[-7.41] [-2.59] [-2.46] [0.75]
iii) Above median ent. income (N = 377) -0.613 a,b -0.404 a,b -0.109 -0.119
[-5.63] [-3.86] [-1.60] [-0.91]
iv) Founder (N = 757) -0.598 a,b -0.218 a -0.280 a,b 0.0107
[-7.71] [-2.81] [-3.68] [0.75]
v) In survival phase (firm age  5 years, N= 347) -0.640 a,b -0.257 a -0.258 a,b -0.0421
[-6.01] [-2.54] [-2.65] [-0.39]
vi) Not in survival phase (firm age > 5 years, N= 563) -0.611 a,b -0.239 a -0.249 a,b -0.00130
[-7.44] [-2.88] [-2.98] [-0.02]
 (entrepreneur) in table 5: -0.614 a,b -0.254 a -0.251 a,b 0.00279
Panel B: Subsets of Managers,
all Entrepreneurs & Employees
vii) CEO or general manager (N = 324) -0.218 b,c -0.274 c -0.0442 b -0.00621
[-2.53] [-3.27] [0.52] [-0.08]
viii) CEO (N = 66) -0.319 b,c -0.367 c -0.0203 b -0.0866
[-2.40] [-2.57] [-0.40] [-0.55]
ix) Above median no. of dir. reports (N = 219) -0.197 b,c -0.259 c -0.0484 0.0830
[-2.31] [-3.04] [-0.49] [0.79]
x) Above median man. income (N = 155) -0.202 b,c -0.370 c -0.00958 b 0.00935
[-1.97] [-3.22] [-0.06] [0.07]
xi) Manager in a firm that is > 15 years old (N = 316) -0.195 b,c -0.247 c -0.0330 b 0.125
[-2.22] [-2.86] [-0.38] [1.35]
 (manager) in table 5: -0.194 b,c -0.219 c -0.0101 b 0.0715
Panel C: Combinations of A&B
i) vs. viii); p-values Wald tests < 0.001 0.57 0.01 0.67
ii) vs. ix); p-values Wald tests < 0.001 0.59 0.17 0.73
iii) vs. x); p-values Wald tests < 0.001 0.25 0.04 0.46
Control variables YES YES YES YES
a) Significant diﬀerence between (subset of) entrepreneurs and employees at the 5% level (Wald test)
b) Significant diﬀerence between (subset of) entrepreneurs and (subset of) managers at the 5% level (Wald test)
c) Significant diﬀerence between (subset of) managers and employees at the 5% level (Wald test)
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Example Survey Cover Letter (translated)
Dear relation of ACE,
Since its establishment in 2006, the Amsterdam Center for Entrepreneurship (ACE) has been con-
ducting high-quality research in the field of entrepreneurship. We aim to continue this ambition
into the future.
That’s why we have initiated a new large-scale study in collaboration with Synpact and VNO-
NCW De Baak, which explores diﬀerences in decision-making between entrepreneurs, managers
and employees.
We would greatly appreciate it if you would be willing to participate in our new unique study,
which includes making choices that have real financial consequences. While your participation will
predominantly be an important contribution to science, the results of this research will also be used
to develop training material for entrepreneurs, managers and employees.
Our questionnaire is online and will take no longer than 20 minutes of your time. Depending on
your decisions and luck, you can win an amount up to €675 if you are selected as a prize winner.
To avoid any conflicts of interest, a civil-law notary will monitor the drawing of the prize winners,
and will make sure that the draw obliges with all legal requirements.
We are very enthusiastic about the value of such insights and we strongly believe that the study
outcomes can also be beneficial for you. We will therefore oﬀer interested respondents the opportu-
nity to receive a free individual report containing the main results of this study. However, for this
report to be really valuable we need the participation of many people. That is, we need you.
We look forward to hearing from you. To participate please click on the link below:
https://uvafeb.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_2mnigp2XTFh3xXL
Can we kindly request you to finalize the survey before October 16th? Since VNO-NCW De Baak,
Synpact and ACE are jointly sending out this survey, it might be that cross-postings will occur.
Our sincere apologies for this in advance. We only require your participation once.
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Appendix B1: Cross-Occupational Experience of Entrepreneurs, Managers and Employees
Entrepreneur Manager Employee
% with Managerial Experience in the past 70.7 - -
Level of past Managerial Experience (scale: 1-5) 1.72 - -
% that is also Employee now 9.0 - -
% that is also Entrepreneur now - 16.9 10.1
Level of current entrepreneurial experience (scale: 1-8) - 1.81 1.33
% with entrepreneurial experience in the past - 12.1 8.9
Level of past entrepreneurial experience (scale: 1-8) - 2.33 1.71
The ‘level of managerial experience’ is measured based on a question about the number of directly reporting
subordinates when and if entrepreneurs were managers beforehand. The answering categories that we coded 1 to 5,
respectively, are 2-5 // 6-10 // 11-25 // 26-50 // More than 50. The ‘level of entrepreneurial experience’ measure
is based on the categorized answers to managers and employees how many fulltime equivalent people they employed
when they were entrepreneurs. This question was posed only to those who had been entrepreneurs in the past.
Answer categories were: 0 // 1-4 // 5-10 // 11-25 // 26-100 // 101-250 // 251-1,000 // More than 1,000 employees.
The first answer (0) corresponds with a value of 1, the second answer (1-4) with a value of 2, and so on.
30
Appendix B2: Cross-Occupational Experience and Risk, Loss and Ambiguity Aversion
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Risk Loss Ambiguity
Aversion Aversion Aversion
Survey (S) or
Experimental (E) (E) (E) (E)
Entrepreneur -0.351⇤⇤⇤ -0.257⇤⇤⇤ 0.0621
[-4.30] [-3.27] [0.75]
Entrepreneur x Also employee (YES=1; NO=0) 0.198 -0.165 0.0205
[1.64] [-1.25] [0.15]
Entrepreneur x Level of past mgmt experience 0.0315 0.0355 -0.0525⇤
(=0 if none) [1.24] [1.36] [-1.80]
Manager -0.264⇤⇤⇤ -0.00826 -0.0309
[-3.16] [-0.10] [-0.34]
Manager x Also entrepreneur (YES=1; NO=0) 0.0679 -0.0556 0.0599
[0.47] [-0.45] [0.42]
Manager x Level of past ent. experience 0.00435 -0.0169 0.0740
(=0 if none) [0.08] [-0.37] [1.22]
Employee x Also entrepreneur (YES=1; NO=0) -0.127 -0.126 -0.0921
[-1.09] [-1.25] [-0.81]
Employee x Level of past ent. experience 0.00542 0.0113 -0.0436
(=0 if none) [0.21] [0.37] [-1.53]
Control variables YES YES YES
N 1805 1805 1805
Log lik. -3967.6 -3863.3 -3837.4
Entrepreneur = Manager1 0.31 < 0.01*** 0.33
1) This reports the p-value of the Wald test ’entrepreneur’ = ’manager’.
This table reports risk -, loss -, and ambiguity aversion of enterpreneurs, managers and employees, including controls
for cross-occupational experiences and interactions. All variables have been defined in Appendix Table B or before.
Control variables are the same as in Table 5. Significance at the 10% level is denoted by *, 5% by **, and 1% by ***,
with t-statistics reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust.
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Figures
Figure 1: Measure of Risk Aversion
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Figure 2: Measure of Loss Aversion
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Figure 3: Measure of Ambiguity Aversion
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Figure 4: CDFs per measure per group
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